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1   Introduction 
This special issue presents revised versions of papers presented at a London sympo-
sium organised by the Lansdown Centre for Electronic Arts in January 2009. The 
articles describe a range of approaches to the theme of evaluation in creative work, 
focused on the changes brought about by digital interactive technologies. They deal 
with specific innovative techniques and new applications of techniques taken from 
other disciplines, and discuss key issues which arise in relation to monitoring, de-
scribing, measuring, analyzing and evaluating the use and reception of creative work. 
They include accounts of complex multi-disciplinary team works, individual personal 
projects, and reflections on extensive periods of engagement with the issues. 
Authors were invited to respond to the following deliberately provocative state-
ment: 
 
The days when artists, media-makers or designers could work 
solely from personal conviction – regardless of the reception of 
their work – are gone. The intelligent artist or designer is now 
deeply interested in discovering the audience’s or the user’s re-
sponse, and keen to use the many techniques and approaches now 
available for doing so. 
2   Why does evaluation matter 
All artists, designers or makers engage in evaluation of some kind: it is fundamental 
to what they do. It is hardly possible for someone holding a pencil to make a simple 
drawing if they are not constantly assessing the degree to which they are making 
productive marks (Schön’s reflection-in-action); later, the decision to reject, retain or 
develop the finished work will additionally be guided by post-hoc assessment (reflec-
tion-on-action (Schön, 1983)). However, this requires only a relationship between the 
maker and the work, and this has often been seen as the only relationship that matters. 
I.A. Richards pointed out long ago that “the artist is not as a rule consciously con-
cerned with communication, but with getting the work, the poem or play or statue or 
painting or whatever it is, ‘right’, apparently regardless of its communicative effi-
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cacy” (Richards, 1928, 26). Many makers have other priorities than finding out how 
their work is responded to. 
If some form of personal evaluative process is ubiquitous and fundamental, this on 
its own is not the kind of evaluation under consideration here. Instead, we are con-
cerned with the very thing Richards sets aside: the mechanisms by which the creative 
worker chooses to find out how his or her work is perceived, understood and acted 
upon by the viewer/listener/user/audience/interactor. And our focus is further nar-
rowed by an interest in the relationship between this evaluation and the use of interac-
tive and digital technologies. What differences do these technologies make to what we 
can, and want to, do? 
2.1 Two traditions: making and HCI  
In relation to interactive digital technologies, there is an obvious body of activity 
which demands attention. Human Computer Interaction (HCI) studies are predicated 
on an assumption that trialling systems with users is essential to effective design. The 
late Brian Shackel, a leading figure in the development of HCI, argued that designing 
without evaluation “is analogous to a pilot who is flying an aircraft with his eyes 
closed – he will end up crashing on the nearest hill” (Shackel, 1994). 
HCI has changed significantly in its relatively short history, and has been owned 
by a number of different disciplines, among them ergonomics and cognitive and 
social science, before becoming a more-or-less standalone professional activity in its 
own right. It now accounts for a sizeable industrial and academic cohort and a signifi-
cant range of activities. Informing all these is the notion of inquiry, of curiosity, of the 
need to know how systems are used and experienced. At one time focussed princi-
pally on the efficiency of task completion by the user, HCI’s more recent changes, 
sometimes referred to as the ‘new HCI’, have emphasised issues such as the user 
experience and the notion of value, both personal and societal.  
Despite these changes, there is a continuing disconnection between the worlds of 
HCI on the one hand and of designing and making on the other. In mid 2008, I  
curated an exhibition of digital interactive designs in conjunction with the CREATE 
conference on ‘creative inventions and innovations for everyday HCI’ held in Lon-
don. The sponsors of the conference were the Ergonomics Society and the BCS Inter-
actions special interest group. In this context, we agreed that in our selection we 
would favour projects which gave account of some sort of evaluative process. To our 
disappointment, even in the face of this call, few of the potential exhibitors had any-
thing to say about evaluation. We ended up with an interesting and enjoyable exhibi-
tion, but one in which, in most cases, the artists’ and designers’ personal knowledge 
and experience were their principal, or only, guides to action. This of course raises a 
fundamental question, of just how valuable evaluation (in the sense defined above) 
really is. If fine works in art, design and media can be made without needing to in-
quire how they are experienced, perhaps such inquiry is just a distraction from all-
important making? Are art or design made better by evaluating the audience’s or 
user’s response? What about designs, acknowledged to be brilliant, made only on the 
basis of personal experience and inherited knowledge?   
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Broadly speaking, HCI is evaluative after the fact, its insights not necessarily em-
bedded into the creative practice which produces new designs. John Carroll wrote in 
1991 that HCI’s role was ‘essentially reactive’ and that human factors evaluation was 
often seen by designers as a hurdle, not a resource (Carroll 1991, 9). Despite the ‘new 
HCI’ this is generally still true. But whereas Carroll’s motivation was to critique HCI, 
ours was also to interrogate art and design practice in the digital domain, and perhaps 
beyond. 
A significant factor in the disconnection between the HCI specialist and the maker 
is a kind of educational segregation which reflects the enduring gulf between the so-
called two cultures of sciences and arts.  It is still the case that most HCI is taught in 
the context of computer science, while the ‘creative’ departments of higher education 
institutions belong to a quite different tradition, in many cases descended from the 
nineteenth century art school with its emphasis on craft skill, learning by making, and 
precedent practice. 
3   The articles 
As one might expect from their willingness to contribute, our authors broadly share an 
advocacy for evaluation, and for its prerequisite, curiosity. Edmonds, Bilda and Mul-
ler say, ‘We find it hard, if not impossible, to define and understand interactive sys-
tems without evaluation or feedback from observing people interacting with those 
systems.’ Marchant, Raybould, Renshaw and Stevens warn against any belief that 
our responses to films can be adequately discovered through introspection, or by 
speculation about the viewing behaviour of others: for them, research is necessary 
into what the film-viewer looks at. Given the reluctance of most film theorists to 
countenance empirical research into how films are perceived and cognised (or in 
many cases even to study what appears on the screen rather than the social, political, 
sexual, ethical and other issues raised by film’s making, content and consumption) 
Marchant et al.’s contribution is especially welcome. 
Our authors’ advocacy is by no means uncritical, and many are wary of the damage 
they may do. Laaksolahti, Isbister and Höök are keen to avoid the classic dangers of 
reductionism, and of destroying through observation the very thing they are studying 
– the pleasure of a good story. This necessitates careful thought about how, if at all, 
the nuanced and complex within the user can be manifested in terms of the measur-
able, or at least the perceptible and describable. Can we investigate the strands of a 
rope without destroying its ropeness? How can users be studied sensitively, so that 
evaluation techniques do not impinge excessively on their experience, and how can 
justice later be done to what is discovered? These authors also fill a significant gap in 
our knowledge, in their case of how interactive stories are experienced.  
The internal, personal and arguably inaccessible character of our individual re-
sponses to the world is similarly perceived as crucial by Hawes. However, in his case 
this is not a problem, but a rationale for the work. His paper stands in contrast to the 
others presented here, in that he is motivated by personal curiosity, not so much about 
how others perceive the maker’s work, but how each of us perceives differently, 
whether maker or user. Like several other authors, Hawes emphasises the ways in 
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which the work is not complete when it leaves the maker’s hand: it is to a significant 
extent created by its observer. This is a commonplace of much cultural theory, but 
unfortunately in that sphere its corollary is seldom examined: but as Hohl succinctly 
puts it, if the audience makes the work, surely we need techniques which allow the 
artist or designer to discover what work the user has made. 
Edmonds et al. also subscribe to the notion (citing Dewey) that “the creative pro-
cess does not end when the artist ‘completes’ the work.” With a strong awareness of 
the long-term antecedents of their own investigations, they note how much of our 
interest in the incompleteness and openness of the work, which in many cases is now 
‘completed’ through interactivity, belongs to a cultural thread running through much 
of the past century’s creative practice. In this sense, art practice is a paradigm of in-
teractivity in other forms. For example, it is partly to art practice that these authors 
trace an issue which interests several others: whereas interactivity might once have 
been considered in terms of a simple user-machine, action-reaction model, we now 
see how it involves long-term changes in each part of the system: the actions of the 
machine produce long-term change in the user, and, increasingly, what the user does 
produces long-term changes in the behaviour of the machine. The creative maker may 
therefore attempt to craft an experience that extends beyond any given user-machine 
transaction – but this raises new problems of evaluation. Springett, perhaps the most 
sceptical of our authors in relation to what can, and cannot, be captured from the 
user’s internal experience, is particularly concerned with the difficulties of these em-
ergent user reactions. Significantly, he is concerned with instrumental, functional 
systems such as those of e-banking, making a clear case that the difficulties which 
arise for evaluation here are quite as profound as those in more obviously ‘art-like’ 
systems, now that the agenda for human computer interaction includes long-term 
experience as much as the completion of tasks. He delivers salutary warnings on the 
difficulties of operationalising the intangible, such as for example capturing a user’s 
sense of trust or mistrust – qualities that the user is not easily able to identify, specify 
or attribute causes for within the system. 
4   Important themes 
The six articles draw out a range of important issues which I have classified under the 
themes of who? what? and how? 
4.1 Who? 
Evaluation which does not benefit the work by informing the maker is of minimal 
interest. But if evaluation is to inform creative practice, who should do it? Are both 
the creative and the evaluative elements carried out by a single multi-skilled individ-
ual, or is collaboration the answer? If the latter, what are the roles of the collaborators, 
and what are their respective motivations? Given their triple-faceted authorship, Ed-
monds et al. have particular insights to offer: in their case, artist, curator and evalu-
ator each have contributions to make, and new, but different, knowledge to gain. The 
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increased use of interactivity, iteratively tested in a public environment, alters not 
only what is done by the collaborating individuals but also the relations between 
them. The need for communication and comprehension between maker and evaluator 
is acute. For Edmonds et al. the role of the contemporary curator has evolved to-
wards a position as facilitator of situations, and as a mediator between artists, art-
works and audiences.  
What equips someone to evaluate interactive systems? Statistical tools for example 
may not be congenial to the artist, designer or media practitioner. Similarly Edmonds 
et al. note that cognitive models of audience engagement, whilst useful, are not nor-
mally the key concern of the artist. Springett’s plea for triangulation – the use of 
multiple evaluation methods to create a rich picture of interaction – also has implica-
tions in terms of expertise. In terms of who benefits from evaluation, Hawes is moti-
vated as much by a desire to present what he has discovered about perception to scep-
tical fellow artists (as a foundation for a philosophical position), as by the production 
or discovery of an aesthetic response in the viewer.  
If there are issues of expertise for the artist, designer, maker who is out in the 
world, these also arise within an academic context. An increasing number of universi-
ties offer practice-led PhDs. Can such a qualification be awarded without the student 
evaluating what has been made? What forms of evaluation are acceptable, or unac-
ceptable?  
4.2 What?  
What knowledge should our evaluations produce? What are we studying? What are 
we trying to discover? And what are the outputs: in what form should new knowledge 
be represented? 
 
4.2.1 What are we studying? 
In Laaksolahti et al.’s account of responses to interactive stories, what we are study-
ing may be the artefact/process as perceived by the subject (eg. what happens in the 
story), the underlying qualities of the artefact/process (eg. the apparent mood of the 
participants or character of the situations in the story), the subject’s own reactions (as 
monitored by themselves), and at any time it may not be immediately obvious which 
of these the user is presenting to the evaluator. There is a commitment among our 
authors to respecting the subtlety, the complexity, the intangibility, the situatedness 
and the long-term nature of many user responses. For Edmonds et al, ‘it may be said 
that if an artwork can only allow one reading and can only work at one level then it 
cannot be very interesting.’ Hohl describes his several – perhaps divergent, perhaps 
competing – objectives for the system he designed, and his approach to teasing out 
such conflicts in his evaluation methods. For Laaksolahti et al., it is emotion, and 
other less-easily captured modes of response, which are the problem and the fascina-
tion. And Springett points out that the intangible need not always be identified with 
the emotional – it may be as difficult to discover, or find the causes for, an intellectual 
change as for an emotional one. Coming from a background in mainstream HCI, he 
emphasises the substantial gulf between the sensitive work which is being undertaken 
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in evaluating responses to arts and media experiences and the crudity of techniques 
still generally used to assess attitudes and responses to more functional systems.  
 
4.2.2 What are we making? 
What are we trying to make? What are the most legitimate, and the most useful, forms 
of output from evaluative research: description, analysis, model-building (such as 
Edmonds et al.’s design cognition models or Laaksolahti et al.’s patterns of interac-
tion), measurement, critique, contextualisation, assigning value? I have noted 
Springett’s advocacy of triangulated multiple methods, while Laaksolahti et al., 
argue for a form of ‘thick description’ – a term modelled on Appiah’s (1993) argu-
ment for ‘thick translation’ which, rather than being a bare conversion of the words of 
one language to another, is accompanied by historical and cultural explanation. Mar-
chant et al. offer multiple forms of output: post-processed versions of a feature film 
recording patterns of viewing in graphic forms; stills and moving images with heat-
maps; charts and graphs; number. Frustrated at the level of detail provided by turnkey 
analysis software, they chose to probe the underlying data. As forms of output, charts 
and graphs are seen by some makers as profoundly ‘other’ – the product of an alien 
scientific culture. But from an eighteenth-century point of view (when our current 
forms of data visualisation began to be invented by pioneers such as Priestley and 
Playfair), such statistical representations are also things of beauty in themselves. In 
this light, the line of a moving average traced through a dense scatter-plot has an 
equal right to be considered aesthetically as the film whose viewing it represents. 
Again, Hawes turns this difficulty on its head, fine-tuning the material of his art in 
order to maximise its yield in terms of varied eye-tracker scan-paths. The ‘scientific’ 
imagery is the artwork. 
Lingering for a moment on the apparently special character of art, it is worth not-
ing Edmonds et al.’s point that ‘evaluation techniques can help an artist to emphas-
ise, rather than “smooth over”, difficult aspects of an experience.’ While it is certainly 
true that we will not generally want our e-banking system or our flight-deck controls 
to make tasks routinely more difficult, we must acknowledge that in the world of 
interactive media, even beyond art practice, there is an increasing need for well-
crafted difficulty, whether in an interactive story, a video-game, an intriguing piece of 
advertising or any of the many systems designed to support education and training. It 
would be a great mistake therefore if the detection of the user’s perplexity or inca-
pacity were considered always a prelude to removing those obstacles. Evaluative 
investigation may allow the better construction of difficulty, rather than its elimina-
tion. 
4.3 How? 
How can we operationalize our inquiry: what methods can be used to collect and 
understand the required information? In one sense, thinking of newly available tech-
nologies, we could say: eye-trackers, digital recorders, two-way mirrors, physical 
correlates for feelings, many other physical and technological devices. But, even if 
dependent on a technical context, more profoundly, what are our research methods? 
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4.3.1 Accounting for Context 
Most of our authors agree on the importance of contextual setting, even when their 
techniques oblige them to use a partly abstractive, laboratory-based approach. This 
requires revisiting a fundamental tension in (scientific) investigation – the usefulness 
and the dangers of investigating and measuring something out of context – the choice 
between laboratory and fieldwork to exploit the advantages of each. 
 
4.3.2 Layered evaluation 
A practice of particular interest is layered evaluation, in which users are given an 
opportunity to reflect on and analyse their own responses which have been recorded 
in some other form. Several articles deal with such an approach. Laaksolahti et al. 
review with users the video-recordings and other representations of those same users’ 
transactions with their distinctive Sensual Evaluation Instrument, using the non-verbal 
transactions as a source of data for the designer, and as a stimulus for discussion with 
the user. Edmonds et al. use video-cued recall, in which a video recording of an 
encounter between a member of the audience and the work is subsequently played 
back to that person, while the user comments on what they were thinking, attempting 
or feeling during the experience. Hawes’ work is inherently recursive, with users 
looking at images representing their own looking. In Marchant et al.’s work too, 
visualised patterns of viewing allow the user to examine and reflect upon their own 
viewing experience of the film and compare it with that of up to seven other partici-
pants. This is a form of second-order cybernetics which in some cases both creates 
new works and allows deeper, richer forms of evaluation. 
 
4.3.3 Representation and language 
There is a scepticism among our authors about representation in all its forms, espe-
cially self-representation by users. Just interviewing witnesses will not do. In our 
case, this is not to imply in users a desire to deceive, but simply to acknowledge their 
difficulties in representing elusive experience, whether at the time (reactivity effects, 
distraction and other problems) or retrospectively (post-hoc rationalisation, inad-
equate recall). 
Concerns of several authors crystallise around the need for openness, so for exam-
ple Laaksolahti et al. avoid using a pre-formed coding scheme, allowing the attribu-
tion of meaning to be created on the fly by the subject. What problems of private 
language does this raise, and how can these be overcome? Similarly Hohl on 
grounded theory: ‘the process of coding is open and the themes emerge from the data 
itself.’ A particular value here lies in assessing how far users’ models, described in 
users’ own terms, turn out to differ from the maker’s model. The experience work-
shops of Edmonds et al. are similarly designed to uncover the gaps and connections 
between the maker’s ideal and the audience’s real experience of the work. 
 
4.3.4 The nature of the beast 
‘The quasi-scientific hunting down towards a “proof” is a flawed mission … a differ-
ent philosophy is required,’ says Springett. The work of the researchers gathered here 
presents a range and mix of methods. Some are numeric, while for other authors their 
chosen methods, in Hohl’s words, ‘allowed us to get a deeper insight into our visi-
tors’ experiences than we could have achieved with a quantitative method.’ While 
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large-scale studies and statistical methods are of undoubted value, the question must 
arise, ‘of value to whom?’ When the primary motivation is to gain insights, through 
evaluation with users, to feed back into the creative practice of the maker, the collec-
tive opinion of our authors – if there is one – generally favours the deep, multi-
layered, probing and richly textured account yielded by detailed inquiry and small 
case studies. While these will not always yield findings which can be defended statis-
tically, they seem likely to be highly productive in attempting to complete the circle 
of the creative process.  
In closing, I paraphrase a question from one of our authors – a question which can 
be taken as rhetorical or not, depending on the reader’s preference. What can we lose 
by knowing how the audience perceives our work?  
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